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I. Introduction
The Report1 of the Newfoundland Law Reform Commission on section 9 of the 
Registration of Deeds Act2 contains a detailed and interesting analysis of the 
present state of the law of Newfoundland with respect to execution against land. 
The following comments may be of some assistance in developing a modern and 
efficient system for execution against land for Newfoundland.
In canvasing the possible bases for seizing and selling land, I was initially 
concerned that the Report did not discuss the possibility that a judgment might 
bind land. The English Statute of Westminster II (1285)3 provided that a 
common law judgment created a lien on the debtor’s land. Such a judgment lien 
could arguably4 have been received law of the colony and therefore part of the 
common law of Newfoundland today. However, in 1732 the Imperial Parliament 
enacted a Statute5 that expanded the scope the writ of fieri facias for the North 
American colonies by making land exigible as if it were goods and chattels. 
Ontario courts6 have held that the Imperial Statute of 1732 abolished the common 
law judgment lien by implication. Newfoundland, it appears, did not introduce 
legislation to preserve this judgment lien on the assumption that it did form part 
of the received law of the colony. Nevertheless, land could be seized and sold 
since the Imperial Statute of 1732 itself extended the scope of the writ of fieri 
facias to reach land. With the repeal of this Imperial Statute in 1887, the authority 
making land exigible in Newfoundland was no longer clear.7
The Report canvasses a number of statutory provisions, in particular the
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Chattels Real Act,8 which possibly make land exigible in Newfoundland today. The 
analysis appears to be both complete and the conclusion correct — there is no such 
clear authority for executing against land in Newfoundland. The need for reform 
appears obvious.
The Report recommends that there be clear statutory provision permitting a 
creditor to bind the land of a debtor by first delivering an Execution Order to the 
sheriff and then by registering it in the provincial land registry office located in St. 
John’s. The lien created would be a specific lien which would require that a 
description of the property to be bound accompany the Execution Order. Since 
Newfoundland does not have a system of pro rata sharing, priority among creditors 
would be determined on the basis of the time of delivery of the Execution Order 
to the sheriff. As against third party transferees, the Execution Order would not 
bind the land until ten days after it was registered in the land registry office. 
These recommendations would require changes to the Judicature Act,9 the 
Registration Of Deeds Act,10 and to the Rules of Court.11
Following are some comments on the proposals for reform with respect to the 
time of binding, priorities among creditors, and the choice between a general or 
specific lien.
II. Time of Binding
(a) Present State of The Law
On the assumption that land is presently exigible under an Execution Order, 
the Report attempts to determine when land would be bound by that Order. 
Reference is then made to section 9 of the Registration of Deeds Act12 to 
determine when land is bound by an Execution Order for all purposes. Section 
9 states in part that:
All instruments... not duly proved and registered... shall be judged fraudulent and 
void... as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration 
who shall first register his instrument... or against any creditor who shall have 
actually seized or levied under attachment or execution: Provided that such 
attachment with a description of the property attached, shall be entered by the 
sheriff in his office books immediately after such attachment shall be executed and 
duly returned.
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Due to the lack of any clear statutory authority, this provision has been considered 
to be of general application even though it is simply a statement of defeasance of 
certain interests in specified circumstances. The assumption appears to be that 
section 9 provides that land is bound upon seizure by the sheriff. However, it is 
arguable that the section contemplates and permits binding prior to the act of 
seizure by the sheriff; for example, upon delivery of the Execution Order to the 
sheriff. Delivery of the writ of fieri facias to the sheriff was the time when the 
goods and chattels of the judgment debtor were bound and the Imperial Statute 
of 173213 deemed land to be goods and chattels. The Imperial Statute was the 
basis for executing against land in 1862 when section 9 of the Registration of Deeds 
Act was first enacted.14 If land were bound on delivery of the writ at that time, 
how would priorities be determined in circumstances where a judgment creditor 
had delivered a writ to the sheriff after the judgment debtor had conveyed an 
interest in the land but before the transferee had registered the instrument of 
transfer. Under the common law principle of Jellett v. Wilkie,15 the conveyance, 
even if never registered, would have priority over the interest of the “subsequent” 
judgment creditor.16
However, section 9 could easily be interpreted as providing that such a 
“subsequent” judgment creditor would have priority over a prior unregistered 
instrument unless that instrument were registered before the sheriff actually seized 
the land. Implying the word “subsequent” before “creditor” where it appears in 
section 9 is consistent with the reference to “subsequent purchaser” earlier in the 
section. This interpretation appears to be both consistent with the clear statutory 
scheme of binding at the time and the apparent purpose of the section which is to 
deal with priorities of registration and not with the time of binding of executions 
generally. This interpretation would also make the situation in Newfoundland with 
respect to such priority issues consistent with that in other jurisdictions such as 
New Brunswick.17
The Report18 suggests, however, that there may have been policy 
considerations which possibly led colonial law-makers to conclude that land should 
not be bound until the public act of seizure by the sheriff had occurred. Section
nSupra, note 5.
uAn Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law now in force providing for the Registration of Deeds in the 
colony, 1862,25 Viet, c.8 (Nfld); see the Report at 26.
15(1896), 26 S.C.R 282; see also, Dunlop, supra, note 6 at 169.
l6MacDonald v. The Royal Bank of Canada, [1937] O .R  418 (CA.).
llRegistryAct, RS.N.B. 1973, c. R-6, s. 19(2). For a detailed discussion of this provision see, Bank of
Montreal v. Chedore (1986), 7 N.B.R 99 (CA.).
9 was part of a legislative package intended to replace a registration system that 
declared instruments null and void if not registered within six months of their 
execution. The principal complaint seemed to be that it was difficult, if not 
impossible, for those living outside St. John’s to register their instruments within 
the six month period. The current system does not require registration for the 
purpose of validity; it is advisable only for the purpose of maintaining priority. 
Recognizing that many deeds were not registered, the Report concludes that the 
law makers may have decided to protect unregistered owners from creditors of the 
grantor by declaring that land was bound only upon seizure by the sheriff. There 
appears to be no compelling reason to treat creditors differently in this regard 
from other subsequent transferees who acquire an interest in the debtor’s land and 
who may defeat previous unregistered interests by registering first. One possible 
argument for a different result is that the transferee may reasonably trust that the 
transferor will not convey the property again, while no such trust or control exists 
with respect to the grantor’s creditors. If this were a major concern, a system 
where land was bound only upon seizure by the sheriff might be desirable.
There is some question whether it is still open for the Newfoundland courts 
to adopt the interpretation of section 9 suggested above. It does appear to be 
inconsistent with the assumption apparently underlying the decision of the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Gough v. Esso Home Comfort Centre.19 On 
a review of this case, as well as other authorities noted in the Report,20 it appears 
that section 9 has been applied to require a physical act of seizure by the sheriff 
in order to bind the lands of a judgment debtor. If this is the current state of the 
law, it is certainly an unsatisfactory situation. The act of seizure is clearly an 
inappropriate event for binding land in a modern system of execution, particularly 
where a land registry system exists.
(b) Principles for Reform
Since any reform in this area of the law would be relatively independent and 
specialized, fundamental reform is possible without disturbing the general law of 
execution in the province. In these circumstances, reform should be 
unencumbered by existing execution processes which were never intended or 
designed to reach land. Ideally, all provisions necessary to implement a new 
system for execution against land should be, to the extent possible, contained in 
one statute and integrated with the land registry system.
Based on this approach, a new system could be created under which land 
would be made exigible and bound upon registration of a new instrument in the
19(1988), 71 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 226 (Nfld. CA.).
“ See supra, note 1 at 25.
land registry office. This instrument, perhaps called a Certificate of Judgment 
Lien, would determine priorities for all purposes. The Certificate would be 
available to judgment creditors or creditors who had obtained an Attaching Order 
prior to judgment. The statutory scheme would make it clear that no other 
enforcement procedures could be used to reach the debtors land with the possible 
exception of a Receiving Order by way of equitable execution. The creation of a 
new process avoids the confusion and complication that results if the Execution 
Order is used, and the questions that could arise with respect to such issues as the 
requirement for seizure and the application of the sale procedures. An even more 
basic concern is that the Execution Order is in essence the common law writ of 
fieri facias and combines the dual function of binding and realization. It is 
important to appreciate that the functions of binding and realization should be 
clearly separated in order to attain the maximum simplicity and efficiency possible. 
In my proposal, the Certificate of Judgment Lien would bind the land while a 
separate process, perhaps called a Direction for the Sale of Land, would be 
required to complete the basics of the system. This new process would authorize 
and direct the sheriff to sell the land of the debtor in order to realize on the lien 
created by the Certificate.
(c) The Recommendation for Reform
The basic recommendations made in the Report with respect to the time and 
scope of the binding of the debtor’s land are as follows:
(4) The Judicature Act, 1986 should be amended to provide that the interest of a 
debtor in land, as well as the interest in land of any purchaser, mortgagee, or other 
transferee from the debtor under an instrument, shall be bound by an execution 
order or attached by an attachment order from the time of delivery of the order 
to the sheriff.
(5) The Judicature Act, 1986 should be amended to provide that notwithstanding 
the delivery of an execution order or attachment order to the sheriff, no such order 
shall prejudice the title of any purchaser, mortgagee or other transferee of an 
interest in land from the debtor under an instrument who has registered his 
instrument at the registry of deeds before the registration of such order.
(6) The Registration of Deeds Act and The Judicature Act, 1986 should both be 
amended to provide that, notwithstanding the registration of an execution order 
or attachment order at the registry of deeds, no such order shall prejudice the title 
of any purchaser, mortgagee or other transferee of an interest in land from the 
debtor under an instrument who has registered his instrument at the registry of 
deeds within ten days of the registration of the order in the registry of deeds, 
except in the case of a transferee who has had actual notice of the order prior to 
the execution of his instrument.
These recommendations use the Execution Order for both binding and realization, 
create a dual system of priorities, require the creditor to both deliver and register
the Execution Order, and reverse the common law principle of Jellett v. Wilkie. 
The comments to follow will deal first with concerns relating to the general 
scheme of priorities proposed; in particular the effect on the rights of third parties 
with an interest in the debtor’s property. Secondly, the dual aspect of the priority 
system proposed will be dealt with in the context of priorities between creditors.
As noted, the proposals for reform would basically give a creditor priority over 
all unregistered interests in the debtor’s land. In contrast, under the common law 
principle of Jellett v. Wilkie,21 a creditor could not be in a better position with 
respect to the debtor’s property than the debtor. Therefore, a subsequent creditor 
could not take priority over a prior bona fide purchaser of the debtor’s land even 
though the instrument was never registered. This common law principle appears 
to be fundamentally sound since the creditor is not a purchaser of the property 
from the debtor. The unsecured creditor’s right to sell the property is only a 
remedy given by the law of execution. However, as is often the case, such 
principles must be balanced against other policy considerations. There is a need 
to promote the registration of instruments, to maintain the integrity of the registry 
system, and to reduce the risk of fraud on creditors. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to require that a bona fide purchaser register an instrument within a reasonable 
time after its execution. If the instrument is not so registered, then the creditor 
should be given priority. This approach appears to reach an equitable balance and 
is simple. The interpretation of section 9 suggested above would provide a similar 
balance by requiring that, to take priority over the creditors interest, instruments 
be registered before the sheriff actually seizes the land.
The principle of Jellett v. Wilkie22 coupled with a requirement to register 
within a reasonable time recognizes the practicalities of real estate transactions, 
including closings outside of the registry office. This approach will not eliminate 
the need for a sub-search prior to closing. A sub-search prior to closing will 
always be required to ensure that an instrument, such as a mortgage or an 
Execution Order, has not been registered prior to closing. However, in the case 
of closings outside of the registry office, a closing in escrow would not be 
necessary to enable the purchaser to confirm that an Execution Order had not 
been registered after closing but before the registration of the deed. A closing in 
escrow would not be necessary for this purpose since, even if a creditor registered 
an Execution Order during that period, the purchaser will have priority as against 
the creditor as long as the deed is registered within the statutory time period after 
closing. A closing in escrow will still be necessary, however, to enable the 
purchaser to determine whether an instrument of another type, such as a deed or
mortgage, has been registered during that period.
The Report rejected of the principle of Jellett v. Wilkie23 even though it was 
recognized as the simplest solution to the problem of an Execution Order being 
registered after closing but before registration of the deed. The only reason given 
for this decision was stated as follows:
The Commission accepted the argument that the rule in. Jellett v. Wilkie would not 
work successfully in a system which did not have registry closings. A registry 
closing fixes the date of the deed’s execution; it is signed, sealed, and delivered. 
There is little opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated against an execution 
creditor by back dating a deed. If Jellett v. Wilkie were restored without the 
practice of registry closings also being implemented (which is impractical given the 
fact that the province’s only registry is in St. John’s), whenever a deed is registered 
after an execution order, but executed, apparently, before the registration of the 
execution order, the question will arise as to whether the deed was actually 
executed before the registration of the execution order. The Commission 
concluded that, by itself, the reinstatement of Jellett v. Wilkie would lead to 
uncertainty and serve only to create unproductive litigation.24
As illustrated above, the common law rule is actually more compatible with 
closings out of the registry office than the system being recommended. The risk 
of fraud through back-dating does not appear to be a compelling reason to reject 
that rule as the basis for determining general priority questions.
The Report, having rejected the common law rule of Jellett v. Wilkie,25 went 
on to recommend that the Execution Order not be binding as against third party 
transferees for a period of ten days after registration. This was considered 
necessary to accommodate closings outside the registry office by permitting the 
registration of the deed after closing. In light of the alternate approach suggested 
above for restoring and balancing Jellett v. Wilkie,26 the ten day delay appears to 
be a further unnecessary complication for a system that should be as simple as 
possible. In assessing the advisability of the delay, it should also be remembered 
that Execution Orders are not the only instruments that may be registered after 
closing but before the registration of the purchaser’s deed. Applying the same 
reason used to justify the ten day delay to protect against the registration of 
Execution Orders, a similar delay period should also exist for all instruments. It 
would appear that a practice of closings in escrow could resolve these problems 
without the need for any statutory delay period.
“ ibid.
^See Report, supra, note 1 at 33.
25Supra, note 15
*Ibid.
Another concern is that neither the proposals for binding nor the ten day delay 
adequately address the rights of persons who may have acquired an interest in the 
debtor’s land other than by an instrument prior to delivery or registration of the 
Execution Order. This may be of particular concern for the deemed joint tenancy 
created under section 8 of The Family Law Act.27
Even though the principal reason for the proposed system is to reduce the risk 
of fraud on creditors, there is a concern that it may have the opposite result. For 
example, an instrument may have been executed many months or years before the 
debtor experiences the financial problems that result in the registration of the 
Execution Order. Such an instrument could be used to both surprise and defeat 
creditors by registering it when the creditor first commences the action against the 
debtor. While this type of fraud can be controlled with a requirement to register 
within a reasonable time after execution, the recommendation for a ten day delay 
increases the possibility that it will occur. For a period of ten days after 
registration of the Execution Order, the debtor could transfer the land and the 
instrument could be registered.
The Report does recommend that a person with actual notice of the Execution 
Order, who purchases during this period, should not be protected. It should be 
noted briefly that it is not clear whether the actual notice is of the registration of 
or the issuance of the Execution Order. However, if there were a transfer during 
this period, there would then be litigation on the issue of “actual notice.”
If the ten day delay is adopted, it would seem both simpler and consistent with 
sound policy to state that all instruments which take effect after the registration 
of the Execution Order should be defeated. One should not forget the objective 
of encouraging transferees to search the registry office before any transfer 
becomes effective. A purchaser or mortgagee should be expected to find the 
Execution Order on a sub-search before closing or advancement of funds. The 
purpose of the ten day delay is not to eliminate the need for sub-searches, but only 
to preserve the priority of previously executed deeds which are registered after the 
registration of the Execution Order. This approach of giving the Execution Order 
priority over all subsequent instruments, would require a determination of the 
effective date of the transfer. Since the question of the effective date may be the 
source of some litigation, this approach may be considered unacceptable. 
However, the Report did decide that a certain amount of litigation on the question 
of “actual notice” was acceptable. One cannot help but wonder why it would not 
be preferable to restore the common law principle of Jellett v. Wilkie28 if a certain 
amount of litigation in the system is acceptable.
In summary, it is suggested that the principle of Jellett v. Wilkie29 can be 
balanced with the need to control fraud, promote the registration of instruments, 
and maintain the integrity of the registry system. As indicated, the balance can be 
attained in a manner that is both simple and workable from the standpoint of real 
estate practice including closings outside the land registry office. This can be 
accomplished by enacting a defeasance provision in favour of creditors as against 
instruments not registered within a reasonable time after their execution.
II. Priorities Among Creditors
Where the execution system and the land registry system are to be integrated, it 
is certainly preferable that the land of the debtor be bound for all purposes upon 
registration of a document. Registration should be the basis for determining the 
priority of a creditor as against third party transferees as well as between other 
creditors. The Report, however, recommends two systems for determining the 
priority of the Execution Order; one as against third party transferees and the 
other as against other creditors who have also bound the debtor’s land. A dual 
system of priorities was deemed necessary since, due to the lack of creditors’ relief 
legislation in Newfoundland, creditors’ priorities are on the basis of first come, 
first paid. As a result, the Report would require that two steps be taken by 
creditors in order to fully secure their position with respect to land of the debtor. 
A creditor must first deliver the Execution Order to the sheriff and then register 
it in the land registry office. The system being proposed is complicated, perhaps 
inequitable, and probably unnecessary even when the priority system is based on 
first come, first paid.
The Report considered that priorities based solely on the registration of an 
instrument in the land registry office would not be feasible. It was feared that, 
because the sheriff would not have direct knowledge of the order of such 
registration, it would not be possible to conduct a proper sale and distribution of 
the proceeds. The fundamental problem is that one process, which was never 
intended or designed for land, is being used to both bind and realize on the 
debtor’s land. The common law principle is that the sheriff, as an officer of the 
court, can act only on the first execution received since it is the first direction from 
the court to seize and sell the debtor’s land. After the sale, the sheriffs duty is 
to distribute the proceeds to any subsequent creditors in the order that their 
executions bound the property.30
It is suggested that there would be no need for the sheriff to have direct 
knowledge of the priorities between creditors if two separate processes were
*Ibid.
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created as suggested earlier in this comment; the Certificate of Judgment Lien for 
the purpose of binding upon registration and the Direction for the Sale of Land 
for the purpose of directing the sheriff to sell the land in order to realize on the 
lien created by the Certificate. In such circumstances, a dual system of priorities 
is not necessary. The lien or charge created upon registration of the Certificate 
should be considered equivalent to a statutory mortgage. Any creditor who has 
registered a Certificate should be entitled to deliver a Direction for the Sale of 
Land to the sheriff. The sheriff, when so directed, would sell only the interest of 
the debtor bound by that creditor. This interest may be subject to the rights of 
other creditors who had previously bound the debtor’s property. On this 
approach, the sheriff does not need to know the title to the land being sold nor the 
priorities among creditors who have bound that land. Obtaining that information 
becomes the responsibility of the creditor or the purchaser at the sheriffs sale. 
Thus, a clear separation of binding and realization would permit a system of 
execution with priorities based solely on the registration of an instrument in the 
registry office.
An example will more fully illustrate how such a system would work. Assume 
that the debtor owns land in fee simple absolute free and clear of any liens or 
encumbrances. Three creditors of the debtor each register a Certificate in the 
land registry office. The liens thereby created in favour of each creditor would be 
equivalent to first, second, and third mortgages. Assume that the second creditor 
is the first to deliver a Direction for Sale to the sheriff. Accordingly, the sheriff 
would sell an interest in the property to a purchaser at the sheriff s sale. The 
interest acquired by that purchaser would be the interest of the debtor still subject 
to the Certificate of the first creditor but free of the Certificates of the second and 
third creditors. It would be the responsibility of the purchaser, not the sheriff, to 
determine the title to the property being sold. The amount realized would depend 
on the value of the debtor’s interest less the amount still unpaid on the first 
creditor’s Certificate. Since priorities are on a first come, first paid basis, the 
second creditor may be required to give notice to all those persons with a 
subordinate interest as is the case with the distribution of the proceeds of a 
mortgage sale. However, an even simpler alternative would be to adopt the 
requirements applicable to execution creditors in those jurisdictions with creditors’ 
relief legislation. Generally under this type of legislation, a creditor wishing to 
share in the proceeds of a levy by the sheriff must come forward within 30 days 
of notice of the levy being entered in the sheriffs book. Other creditors are not 
entitled to special notice nor is the sheriff under an obligation to search for 
creditors who might be entitled to share.
As indicated earlier, simplicity in the system has its own intrinsic value. The 
proposals made in the Report unnecessarily complicate the system. There is no 
reason given for retaining the Execution Order for both functions of binding and 
realization. There does not appear to have been any discussion of other possible 
mechanisms. One can only conclude that the Execution Order simply represents
the status quo. It is unfortunate that the consequence of this decision is to create 
a dual system of priorities when a more fundamental reform as suggested could 
easily avoid this result.
III. General or Specific Liens
The Report recommends that the Execution Order continue to create a specific 
lien rather than a general lien. With a general lien, the creditor would simply 
register a document which would bind all of the debtor’s land in the province 
without the need to describe the specific properties being bound. Also, a general 
lien usually binds any land subsequently acquired by the debtor during the 
currency of the registered document. However, the binding of after-acquired 
property is not inherently or necessarily part of the general lien concept. In 
contrast, a specific lien requires that a sufficient description of the property to be 
bound accompany the document that is to be registered in the land registry office. 
With a specific lien, there is virtually no possibility of providing that after-acquired 
property will be bound. The Report considers that, because section 9 focused on 
seizure as the effective time of binding, only a specific lien exists under the present 
law.
The Report reviews the advantages and disadvantages of a general lien from 
both the standpoint of creditors and the system as a whole. With respect to 
creditors, the Report identifies what were perceived to be problems with a general 
lien. The first problem identified is that a general lien would only benefit the first 
creditor to register since that creditor would thereby gain control over the sale of 
all of the debtor’s land. It is also suggested that the general lien would cause a 
reduction in the efficiency of the execution system. Both of these problems appear 
to exist if the Execution Order is retained since the sheriff could only sell the land 
under the first Order delivered. If two new documents are created as suggested, 
all creditors would benefit in accordance with the order of registration, regardless 
of whether the debtor’s land is bound by a general or specific lien.
The Report is also concerned that a general lien would permit fraud on 
creditors. The following scheme was suggested as an example of how fraud could 
be perpetrated: an accomplice of the debtor could obtain a judgment against the 
debtor, bind all of the land of the debtor, and refuse to give specific instructions 
to the sheriff to sell the land. Again, it is suggested that this problem does not 
exist as a result of a general lien, but as a result of retaining the Execution Order 
thereby requiring the sheriff to sell on the first Order received. This opportunity 
for fraud exists regardless of whether a specific or general lien is created. This 
sort of activity is properly and better controlled by the law relating to fraudulent 
conveyances and preferences.
The Report suggests that the general lien may cause an increase in
bankruptcies since creditors will see a more favourable distribution of the debtor’s 
assets under federal law. While this may be true, it would not be as a result of a 
general as opposed to a specific lien, but as a result of the lack of a system of pro 
rata sharing under provincial law.
One concern expressed in the Report of significant negative consequence is the 
potential for confusion over similar names. While the similar name problem exists 
for purchasers searching titles, how great a problem is it if properly controlled? 
The incidence of this problem can easily be reduced by requiring the creditor to 
provide, with the Execution Order or Certificate to be registered, sufficiently 
detailed information with respect to the debtor. If these steps were taken, is the 
similar name problem of sufficient concern that a general lien should be rejected? 
In answering the question, one must remember that the alternative of a specific 
lien has its own administrative problems. For example, the Report spends some 
time in dealing with the question of what constitutes a sufficient description of the 
specific property to be bound by the lien. On balance, it appears that the general 
lien is still the preferred option.
In the final analysis, the Report’s recommendation for a specific lien reflects 
a desire to maintain the status quo as a result of resistance to change within the 
Bar. It is unfortunate that the Report did not take the relatively small steps 
necessary to create a system with a general lien.
IV. Conclusions
The Report clearly identifies the need for changes in the law relating to execution 
against land in Newfoundland. While the amendments being proposed do clarify 
the authority for executing against land, they are technical amendments which 
create an unnecessarily complicated system. An ideal opportunity exists for basic 
reform in this relatively self-contained area of the law of execution. As suggested 
earlier in this comment, the execution system and the land registry system can be 
integrated by using two processes; a Certificate of Judgment Lien and Direction 
for the Sale of Land. A general lien could be created with or without the binding 
of after-acquired property. The general lien would determine priorities for all 
purposes subject to the common law rule of Jellett v. Wilkie;31 that is, a creditor 
can be in no better position with respect to the debtor’s property than the debtor. 
In order to prevent fraud on creditors and to promote and preserve the integrity 
of the registry system, a defeasance provision would require that an instrument be 
registered within a reasonable time after its execution. This alternative proposal 
for reform is workable in a system where creditors priorities are based on the 
principle of first come, first paid. In addition, the system is perhaps preferable in 
a jurisdiction where the practice of law regularly involves real estate closings
outside the registry office.
If Newfoundland does decide to undertake reform in the area of execution 
against land, it will be interesting to see the extent of any such reform.
